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PRESS DEFINITION AND THE RELIGION ANALOGY
RonNell Andersen Jones*
In her Article, Press Exceptionalism,1 Professor Sonja R. West urg-
es the Court to differentiate a specially protected sub-category of "the
press" from a broader, less-protected category of "occasional public
commentators." She makes compelling arguments that this protection
is likely to increase the volume of important contributions to the flow
of public information. Whatever benefits might be produced by this
press exceptionalism, however, they are only valuable if the exception-
ally protected "press" can be identified.
The model that Professor West proposes for this identification,
based on the approach that the Supreme Court employed in demarcat-
ing the category of "ministers" in the 2012 Hosanna-Tabor case, 2 is an
attractive one, insofar as it analogizes to another, somewhat parallel
First Amendment definitional question. The who-is-a-minister inquiry
illustrates that the Court need not shy away from the endeavor of de-
fining the boundaries of a uniquely protected group merely because it
is a complicated task. The inquiry also shows that the Court can
elaborate upon those boundaries over time as the relevant contours
naturally come before it in real-world decisions. The inquiry in Ho-
sanna-Tabor, like the press-definition inquiry, arises in a First Amend-
ment setting in which we have a goal of allowing a set of ideas or
communications to develop free from governmental interference and in
which the free development of those ideas depends on granting a de-
gree of autonomy to certain institutions and the players within them.
Thus, the inquiry into how we do this job in the religion context feels
like a potentially fruitful place to turn for insights into how to achieve
our rights-based goals related to the press.
As attractive as the Hosanna-Tabor approach is in the abstract,
though, it falls short of offering an apt analogy for the task of defining
the press. In some key ways, defining a minister in Hosanna-Tabor is
sufficiently different from defining the press that the comparison
breaks down. Most significantly, although Professor West suggests
that her proposed approach is a "functional" one,3 the Hosanna-Tabor
analysis that she borrows is a four-factor test with only two factors
that are truly functional in nature and two that are quite explicitly
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
1 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434 (2Q14).
2 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2Q12).
3 See West, supra note i, at 2454-55.
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formalist, in that they rise and fall entirely on internal and external la-
beling rather than on any behavior, operation, or consequence of per-
formance. Although the two truly functionalist factors that Professor
West borrows may offer useful insights into which actors are behaving
as the "press" for constitutional purposes, the formalist factors are, for
the reasons articulated below, not only not helpful to this task, but po-
tentially harmful. Because these key aspects of the minister-definition
analysis cannot be repurposed for the press-definition setting, more
work remains to be done in devising a truly functional approach for
identifying actors who would qualify for Press Clause protection.
The formalist elements of Hosanna-Tabor are inappropriate in the
press-definition setting for a number of reasons. First, at a fundamen-
tal level, the reason the Court needed to develop a definition of minis-
ter and the reason Professor West needs a definition of the press are
essentially opposite. If someone is a minister under the Court's Ho-
sanna-Tabor definition, then he or she is deprived of the protection of
Title VII,4 whereas if someone is a member of the press under Profes-
sor West's proposal, the consequence is that he or she is entitled to ad-
ditional constitutional protection. The different incentives created in
these two situations mean that recognition by others as a minister 5 or
holding oneself out as a minister 6 - two primary components of the
Hosanna-Tabor inquiry that Professor West proposes be repurposed for
the press-definition inquiry7 - are ill-suited to identifying speakers
who are best fulfilling the unique constitutional functions of the press.
When one self-identifies as a minister, one is making something like an
admission against interest that heightens its credibility: there are costs
to that self-identification, including not being protected by employ-
ment discrimination laws. That rubric is substantially less helpful
when trying to decide the press definitional questions, where what is at
stake is the gaining of a constitutional right, such that the self-
identification incentives plainly run in the opposite direction. External
recognition, which the Hosanna-Tabor analogy also suggests is useful,
may work no better as a marker than self-recognition, because reliance
on professional-organizations' acknowledgement of the press to identi-
fy the press is likely to favor old media, who, for now at least, continue
to control membership and educational trajectories and may skew
guidelines to burden particular newcomers. Adopting the formalist la-
beling approach that works in Hosanna-Tabor thus might unfairly dis-
advantage non-traditional news sources that are unquestionably ful-
filling the quintessential constitutional press functions. All of these
4 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705.
5 Id. at 699-700, 707.
6 Id. at 707-09.
7 See West, supra note i, at 2456.
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differences between identifying a minister and identifying the press
suggest that Hosanna-Tabor may not do the work that Professor West
is hoping it will do on these formalist prongs of the borrowed test.
Additionally, the analogy to Hosanna-Tabor is unsatisfactory be-
cause in that case the Supreme Court did not decide the question of
what is a religion for freedom-of-religion purposes, but rather the
question of who qualifies as a minister in what was assumed to be a
religion.8 Thus, Hosanna-Tabor says very little about what will count
as the press for freedom-of-press purposes; it might, at best, be rele-
vant to the question of which employees of an organization that is as-
sumed to be the press will count as reporters. The opinion in Hosan-
na-Tabor does not create any occasion for addressing the fundamental
question of how the Court will identify the actual object of a guaran-
teed freedom - "religion" under one clause or "press" under the other.
Tying the analysis of who will legally be considered a member of the
press to an affiliation with a press organization begs the question of
what is a press organization, and Hosanna-Tabor does not offer a
framework for answering that initial, root question.
Indeed, in the free exercise context, courts have only rarely dis-
cussed that primary definitional question at all, and have tried to
avoid formalistic, court-delineated definitions of religion when they
have done so. It is true that the Court has appeared to emphasize self-
identification by the proclaimed adherent of apparently sincere reli-
gious beliefs, 9 which might at first blush suggest a formalist labeling
component. Importantly, though, in other contexts, the real weight of
the analysis- the place where the rubber hits the road on the ques-
tion of whether what that adherent believes in is, in fact, a religion for
purposes of free exercise protections or anti-establishment limita-
tions - has been the very functional question of whether those beliefs
occupy a place in the life of their adherents that parallels the place
filled by the orthodox belief in God in a more traditional, obvious reli-
gion.10 Thus, if we model the press inquiry on how the Court may de-
fine "religion," rather than on how the Court defines "minister in a re-
ligion," the task-related functional questions of what the alleged
member of the press is doing and how that behavior parallels the goals
initially envisioned for the most obvious category of the press at the
time of the founding will have a larger or potentially decisive role.
The appropriateness of the partially formalist Hosanna-Tabor mod-
el in the task of press definition is questionable for another, related
reason, rooted in the existence of two separate religion clauses in the
s Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
9 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
10 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
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First Amendment. Because there are two religion clauses tugging on
each other, but only one rights-defining Press Clause, there is arguably
a structural element to Hosanna-Tabor that is not present in the Press
Clause context. The Hosanna-Tabor Court faced not only the argu-
ment that the ministerial exception is a group right under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, but also the argument that because of the structural ad-
judicative disability created by the Establishment Clause, the
government lacks the power to tell the Lutheran Church who it must
hire as a minister under Lutheran theology 1 While the Court in Ho-
sanna-Tabor may have been constrained from adopting a purely func-
tional inquiry by arguments that the Establishment Clause prevents
the Court from undertaking an analysis that would meddle too much
in church affairs, 12 no such constraint exists in the press context,
where courts remain free to take the purer functional approach if that
approach does a better job of identifying who warrants the protection,
as it does.
Finally, the reasons that the First Amendment protects religion are,
in at least some crucial respects, different than the reasons that the
First Amendment protects the press. The free exercise of religion is
protected primarily because it is a matter of personal conscience and
individual self-identity.13 Conversely, because the press is protected
for far more functional reasons - that is, because of what the press is
doing- a completely functional approach makes sense in the press
context in ways that do not make sense in the religion context. Profes-
sor West's work highlights some excellent reasons for protecting the
press, nearly all of which are rooted in specific, valuable tasks: gather-
ing information, acting as a surrogate for and a conduit of news to the
public, and serving as a check on government and the powerful. The
point of giving the press special constitutional protection is to allow it
to do what the Constitution wants it to be doing. Conversely, as a
constitutional matter, we do not necessarily know what we want reli-
gions to be doing. Because they are protected by a freedom-of-
11 Hosanna-Tabor, 1.12 S. Ct. at 706 ("According the state the power to determine which indi-
viduals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits gov-
ernment involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.").
12 See id. at 715 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that "the mere adjudication of such [functional]
questions would pose grave problems for religious autonomy").
13 Certainly there are those who have argued that religion also has a more practical role of
giving the adherent a positive institutional identity vis-a-vis the state. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz,
Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 79 (2009). However, this does not diminish the obvious role that free exercise was designed
to have in preserving freedom of thought and individual autonomy. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson,
An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 12 THE STATUTES AT LARGE 84, 86 (William
Waller Hening ed., 1823) ("[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious wor-
ship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burdened in his
body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief.").
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conscience variety of right, religions are supposed to be able to define
their own purposes and practices in a way that is in tension with the
very outcome-oriented reasons that the Constitution protects press
freedom.
All told, while the portions of the Hosanna-Tabor approach that
call for a task-related functional inquiry might prove useful in creating
the definitional boundaries of Press Clause coverage, the fuller minis-
ter analogy is not apt in the press area. The components of that test
that focus on formalist labeling- either by relying on self-
identification or by giving weight to external identification- do not
translate to the press context, but instead highlight the ways in which
Religion Clause jurisprudence and Press Clause jurisprudence diverge.
Professor West acknowledges that these formalist factors cannot them-
selves carry the entire weight of defining the press, and emphasizes
that they would be only pieces of a larger definitional inquiry.14 But
their inclusion in the analysis would not be benign. A court charged
with making a real-world determination of who is the "press," and giv-
en a model containing two easy-to-apply formalist inquiries into how
the relevant actor has been labeled and two harder-to-apply, more
nebulous functionalist inquiries into what the relevant actor has done
and how that behavior serves the constitutional goals, is likely to give
excessive or even exclusive weight to formalism. Given that these
formalist inquiries are unsuitable as definers outside of the religion
context from which they sprang, they ought not be components of the
wider press-identification model. The formalist Hosanna-Tabor com-
ponents may be attractive to Professor West's overall goal because
they operate more effectively than the functional factors do to cabin
the Press Clause's coverage to a more limited subset of speakers; in the
absence of them, it is significantly harder to restrict the population of
the qualifying group. But given the inapposite nature of this half of
the religion analogy, there is no place for those components in a truly
functional press-identification model. Professor West's work should
therefore be seen as a helpful starting point for a larger inquiry into
how a genuinely functional model of press membership might be con-
structed - a conversation that is worth continuing.
14 See West, supra note i, at 2458 ("A look to press institutions, therefore, can begin - but
must not end - the inquiry.").
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